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1 Introduction
This paper examines technology policy in an economy with innovation and
imitation. Through the development of new products, an innovator achieves
a temporary advantage earning monopoly profits. This advantage ends when
an imitator succeeds in copying the innovation, enters the market and starts
competing with the innovator. In this paper, I assume that (a) firms cannot
borrow without collateral, and (b) they cannot use their immaterial property
(e.g. innovations or imitations) as collateral. It is instructive to see how
these capital market imperfections affect the prospects of technology policy.
There is already a large literature concerning technology policy with im-
itation starting from Segerstrom (1991), who presents a model with the fol-
lowing properties: (i) Producers collude. (ii) R&D firms are subject to
constant returns to scale. (iii) R&D firms can both innovate and imitate.
(iv) Outsiders can innovate a new quality of product at the same cost as the
incumbents. Segerstrom shows that innovation subsidies speed up growth,
but promote welfare only if innovative effort is initially large enough.
Segerstrom’s (1991) model is challenged by the following papers. Walz
(1995) replaces cooperation (i) by Cournot competition and finds out that in
some circumstances innovation subsidies may even retard economic growth.
Davidson and Segerstrom (1998) replace constant returns (ii) by decreasing
returns to scale and show that innovation subsidies promote growth but
imitation subsidies do the opposite. Zeng (2001) obtains more or less similar
results by rejecting (iii) and assuming that innovation improves product
quality while imitation expands product variety.
Property (iv) in Segerstrom’s model leads to leapfrogging: innovations
will always be performed by outsiders and the current industry leaders will
be replaced. The following papers eliminate this unrealistic outcome. Aghion
et al. (1997, 2001) construct models where technological laggards must first
catch up with the leading-edge technology before battling “neck-to-neck” for
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technological leadership in the future. Mukoyama (2003) constructs a model
in which only leaders can conduct next-round innovation, while outsiders
can become leaders by imitation. These papers establish an “inverted-U”
relationship between competition and growth, but with the following differ-
ence. Aghion et al. (1997, 2001) represent competition by the elasticity of
substitution between the firms’ products, while Mukoyama (2003) uses the
proportion of two-producer industries in the economy for that purpose. In
this paper, I preserve Mukoyama’s assumption on cumulative technology, but
measure competition by the elasticity of substitution.
All papers referred above assume that R&D firms can borrow any amount
of capital and the household can make any investment at a given market inter-
est rate. In such a case, firms decide on R&D and households are protected
from uncertainly through diversification in the market portfolio. Because
that assumption is in contradiction with the entire literature of venture capi-
tal,1 it is instructive to assume for a change that firms cannot borrow without
collateral and immaterial property cannot be used as collateral. Firms must
then finance their R&D through issuing shares and households purchasing
these shares face the uncertainly associated with investment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the basic structure of the model. Sections 3 and 4 consider firms in produc-
tion and R&D. Section 5 examines households deciding on saving, section 6
general equilibrium, and section 7 the prospects of public policy. Optimal
elasticity rules for subsidies and competition policy are presented.
2 The model
I extend Wa¨lde’s (1999a, 1999b) growth model with risk-averting households
by replacing the sector of innovating firms by a large number of industries
which innovate or imitate. Following Mukoyama (2003), I eliminate leapfrog-
1A nice summary of this literature in given in Gompers and Lerner (1999).
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ging through the assumption that in the product market only leaders can
innovate. The model can then be characterized as follows:
(i) Labor is homogeneous and inelastically supplied. It is used in innovation,
imitation or the production of the intermediate goods.
(ii) Competitive firms produce the consumption good from a great number
of intermediate goods according to Cobb-Douglas technology.
(iii) All intermediate-good firms produce one unit of their output from one
labor unit. Each intermediate good is produced by a separate industry
and composed of the products of the firms in the industry through
CES technology. The elasticity of substitution between any pair of the
products is used as the measure of product market competition (PMC).
(iv) R&D firms innovate or imitate. Imitation is necessary for an outsider to
become an innovator. A successful imitator enters the product market
and starts an innovation race with the old producers. A successful
innovator becomes a monopolistic producer of the latest technology
until its technology is imitated.
(v) R&D firms finance their expenditure by issuing shares. The households
save only in these shares. Each R&D firm distributes its profit among
those who had financed it in proportion to their investment in the firm.
The subsidies to R&D are financed by lump-sum taxes.
3 Production
There is a great number of intermediate-good industries that are placed over
the limit [0, 1]. The representative consumption-good firm makes its output
y from the products of all intermediate-good firms through technology
log y =
∫ 1
0
log[Bjxj]dj, xj =
[ aj∑
κ=1
x
1−1/ε
jκ
]ε/(ε−1)
,
ε > 1, (1)
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where Bj is the productivity parameter in industry j, aj the number of firms
in industry j, xj the quantity of intermediate good j, xjκ the output of
firm κ in industry j, and ε the elasticity of substitution between any pair of
the products of the firms in the same industry. The consumption-good firm
maximizes its profit
Π
.
= Py −
∫
j∈[0,1]
aj∑
κ=1
pjκxjκdj
by its inputs xj, taking the price P of the consumption good and the input
prices {pjκ} as fixed. I normalize total consumption expenditure Py at unity.
Because the consumption-good firm is subject to constant returns to scale,
we then obtain
Py = 1, Π = 0,
aj∑
κ=1
pjκxjκ = 1 for all j,
pjκ = P
∂y
∂xj
∂xj
∂xjκ
= P
y
xj
∂xj
∂xjκ
= x
1/ε−1
j x
−1/ε
jκ for all j and κ. (2)
All intermediate-good firms produce one unit of their output from one
labor unit. Technological change is random. I assume that a successful
innovator in industry j is able to make a perfect substitute for intermediate
good j, which is a composite product of the outputs of all incumbent firms
in industry j. I assume furthermore that the innovator’s product provides
exactly the constant µ > 1 times as many services as the intermediate good
of earlier generation. To push old producers out of the market, the innovator
in industry j chooses the price pj1 = µw for its product, where w is the wage
for labor.2 From pj = µw and (2) it then follows that
xj = xj1 =
1
pj1
=
1
µw
and pij =
(
1− 1
µ
)
pj1xj1 = 1− 1
µ
for aj = 1. (3)
The innovator is always the first leader in the industry. A successful
imitator of the state-of-art good is able to make a close substitute for the
2Because the productivity of the old producers is equal to 1/µ, with the innovator’s
mark-up rule pj1 = µw the price index of their composite product xj must be equal to µ.
Thus, none of the old producers can charge a price greater than its marginal cost µ.
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product of the innovator. Thus with each imitation, the number of leaders
and products increases by one. I assume that all leaders 1, ..., aj in industry
j behave in Cournot manner, taking each other’s output levels as given.3
Given (1) and (2), leader κ in industry j maximizes its profit
pijκ = pjκxjκ − wxjκ = x1/ε−1j x1−1/εjκ − wxjκ, (4)
by its output xjκ, assuming that the output levels xjı for the other leaders
ı 6= κ in industry j are constant. It therefore sets the wage w equal to the
marginal product of labor:
w = pjκ + xjκ
[
∂pjκ
∂xj
∂xj
∂xjκ
+
∂pjκ
∂xjκ
]
= pjκ + xjκ
[(1
ε
− 1
)pjκ
xj
( xj
xjκ
)1/ε
− 1
ε
pjκ
xjκ
]
= pjκ
[
1 +
(1
ε
− 1
)( xj
xjκ
)1/ε−1
− 1
ε
]
= pjκ
(
1− 1
ε
)(
1− 1
aj
)
.
Because this condition holds for all competitors κ = 1, ..., aj, noting (2) and
(4), we obtain the symmetry xjκ = xj1 for all κ, and
pjκ = Φ(aj)w, Φ(aj)
.
= (1− 1/ε)−1(1− 1/aj)−1, Φ′ < 0, ajpjκxjκ = 1,
pijκ = (pjκ − w)xjκ =
[
1− 1
Φ(aj)
]
pjκxjκ =
[
1− 1
Φ(aj)
]
1
aj
.
= pi(aj), pi
′ < 0,
xj = a
ε/(ε−1)
j xjκ = a
1/(ε−1)
j /[Φ(aj)w]. (5)
I assume that the entry of the second leader decreases the first leader’s mark-
up pj1/w from µ to Φ:
Φ(aj) < µ. (6)
3Alternatively, one could introduce a more general framework through the assumption
that leader κ estimates the response of the other leaders ` 6= κ by dxj`/dxjκ = $xj`/xjκ,
where $ < 1 is a constant. In that model, the special case $ = 0 corresponds to Cournot
competition. The general case $ < 1 would with some complication produce the same
results as this paper. Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) provide a rather convincing argument
for the Cournot assumption. They show that the Cournot game can be interpreted as a
result of a two-stage game in which the firms first choose their capacities and then sell
their products at the market-clearing prices. The unique equilibrium is that in the first
stage the firms fix their capacities at the Cournot output levels.
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Anyone investing in firms attempts to maximize his expected profit. The
innovator is the first leader in an industry. If one invests in imitation to enter
an industry with one leader, then its prospective profit is pijκ
∣∣
aj=2
, but if it
invests (with the same cost) in imitatation to enter an industry with more
than two leaders, then its prospective profit is pijκ
∣∣
aj>2
. Because, by (5), the
profit is smaller with more than two leaders, pijκ
∣∣
aj=2
> pijκ
∣∣
aj>2
, investors
invest in imitation only in one-leader industries. I summarize:
Proposition 1 Each industry has one or two leaders. In one-leader indus-
tries the followers imitate and in two-leader industries the leaders innovate.
I denote the set of one-leader industries by Θ ⊂ [0, 1], the relative pro-
portion of one-leader industries (two-leader industries), α (β) by
α =
∫
j∈Θ
dj, β
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
dj = 1− α. (7)
Noting this, aj = 2, (3), (5) and (6), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 A firm’s profit is piα
.
= 1− 1
µ
in one-leader industries j ∈ Θ
and piβ
.
= 1
2
(
1 − 1
φ
)
in two-leader industries j /∈ Θ, and the total output of
the industry is xα
.
= 1
µw
for one-leader industries j ∈ Θ and xβ = 1φw for
two-leader industries j /∈ Θ, where φ .= Φ(2) ∈ (0, µ) is the mark-up factor φ
in the two-leader industries j /∈ Θ. The higher the elasticity of substitution,
ε, the closer the mark-up factor φ is to one.
Noting proposition 2 and equations (1), (3) and (7), and summing up through-
out all firms and industries, we obtain that the employment of labor in pro-
duction, x, and total output y are determined as follows:
x
.
= αxα + (1− α)xβ = ϕ
w
, ϕ(α, φ)
.
=
α
µ
+
1− α
φ
<
1
φ
,
∂ϕ
∂α
=
1
µ
− 1
φ
< 0,
∂ϕ
∂φ
=
α− 1
φ2
< 0, xα =
x
µϕ
,
∂
∂φ
(xα
x
)
> 0, xβ =
x
φϕ
> 0,
∂
∂φ
(xβ
x
)
< 0,
y = Bxααx
1−α
β = χ(α, φ)xB, χ(α, φ)
.
=
µ−αφα−1
ϕ(α, φ)
, log B
.
=
∫ 1
0
log Bjdj,
(8)
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where x is employment, ϕ = wx wage expenditure and B the average level
of productivity in production. More intense competition (i.e. a smaller φ)
increases employment x and total wages in production, ∂ϕ/∂φ < 0. Because
innovating two-leader industries j /∈ Θ employ more than imitating one-
leader industries j ∈ Θ, a decrease in the proportion α of imitating industries
raises employment x and total wages ϕ in production, ∂ϕ/∂α < 0.
Because innovating two-leader industries j /∈ Θ employ more than imitat-
ing one-leader industries j ∈ Θ, a smaller proportion α of imitating industries
raises employment x and total wages ϕ in production. Because by (8),
1
χ
∂χ
∂φ
=
∂ logχ
∂φ
=
α− 1
φ
− 1
ϕ
∂ϕ
∂φ
=
1− α
φ
( 1
φϕ
− 1
)
> 0,
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 More intense PMC (i.e. a lower mark-up φ in the two-leader
industries) decreases the productivity χ of efficient labor, ∂χ/∂φ > 0.
Proposition 3 can be explained as follows. The problem is the maximiza-
tion of total output y = Bxααx
1−α
β subject to the allocation of labor between
innovation and imitation, x = αxα + (1 − α)xβ, keeping total employment
in production, x, constant. Output y is at the maximum, if all industries
employ the same amount of labor, xα = xβ, and this is possible only if two-
leader industries collude and set monopoly prices. More intense competition
(i.e. a smaller ²) transfers labor from one-leader into two-leader industries
(i.e. xα falls and xβ rises by (8)). The greater the difference xβ − xα, the
lower total output y for given x.
4 Research
Given proposition 1, there are three types of R&D firms: the first leader
(successful innovator), which I call firm 1, the second leader (successful imi-
tator), which I call firm 2, and followers, which we call firm 0. In two-leader
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industry j /∈ Θ, firms 1 and 2 innovate and no firm imitates. The techno-
logical change of firm κ ∈ {1, 2} is characterized by a Poisson process qjκ in
which the arrival rate of innovations is given by
Λjκ = λljκ + ξl for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (9)
where ljκ is the firm’s own input, l total employment in R&D in the economy
and λ > 0 and ξ > 0 are constants. In the production function (9), the
term ξl characterizes the spillover of knowledge between R&D firms. During
a short time interval dν, there is an innovation dqjκ = 1 in firm κ with
probability Λjκdν, and no innovation dqjκ = 0 with probability 1− Λjκdν.
In one-leader industry j ∈ Θ, the representative follower (firm 0) imitates
and no firm innovates. The technological change of firm 0 is characterized
by a Poisson process Qj in which the arrival rate of imitations is given by
Γj = γlj0 for j ∈ Θ, (10)
where lj0 is total imitative input in industry and γ > 0 a constant. During a
short time interval dν, there is an imitation dQj = 1 with probability Γjdν,
and no imitation dQj = 0 with probability 1− Γjdν.
The invention of a new technology in industry j raises the number of
technology in that industry, tj, by one and the level of productivity, B
tj
j , by
µ > 1. Given this and (8), the average productivity in the economy, B, is a
function of the technologies of all industries, {tk}, as follows:
log B{tk} .=
∫ 1
0
log B
tj
j dj, B
tj+1
/
B
tj
j = µ. (11)
The arrival rate of innovations in industry j /∈ Θ is the sum of the arrival
rates of both firms in the industry, Λj1+Λj2. The average growth rate of Bj
due to technological change in industry j in the stationary state is then given
by E
[
log B
tj+1
j − log Btjj
]
= (Λj1 + Λj2) log µ, where E is the expectation
operator.4 Because only industries j /∈ Θ innovate, then, noting (9), the
4For this, see Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 59.
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average growth rate of the average productivity B in the stationary state is
g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
E
[
log B
tj+1
j − log Btjj
]
dj = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
= (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
[
λ(lj1 + lj2) + 2ξl
]
dj. (12)
I use g above as a measure of the growth rate of the economy.
Total employment in R&D is given by
l
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj. (13)
There exists a fixed number N of households, each supplying one labor unit.
Total labor supply N is equal to inputs in production, x, and R&D, l:
N = x+ l. (14)
The government subsidizes R&D expenditures, but possibly at different
rates in innovating and imitating industries. Given proposition 2, we obtain
total expenditures from these subsidies as follows:
R
.
= τα
∫
j∈Θ
wlj0dj + τβ
∫
j /∈Θ
(wlj1 + wlj2)dj, (15)
where wlj0 is expenditure on imitation in firm 0 industry j ∈ Θ, wljκ expen-
diture on innovation in firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ and τα ∈ (−∞, 1)(
τβ ∈ (−∞, 1)
)
is the subsidy to imitation (innovation). If the government
cannot discriminate between innovation and imitation, then τα = τβ.
In industry j ∈ Θ firm 0 and in industry j /∈ Θ firms 1 and 2 issue shares
to finance their labor expenditure in R&D, net of government subsidies. Be-
cause the households invest in these shares, we obtain
N∑
ι=1
Sιj0 = (1− τα)wlj0 for j ∈ Θ,
N∑
ι=1
Sιjκ = (1− τβ)wljκ for κ ∈ {1, 2} and j /∈ Θ, (16)
9
where wlj0 is the imitative expenditure of firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ, τα the
subsidy to it, wljκ the innovative expenditure of firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry
j /∈ Θ, τβ subsidy to it, Sιj0 (Sιjκ) household ι’s investment in firm 0 in
industry j ∈ Θ (firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ), and ∑Nι=1 Sιj0 (∑Nι=1 Sιjκ)
aggregate investment in firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ (firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ).
Household ι’s relative investment shares in the firms are given by
iιj0
.
=
Sιj0
(1− τα)wlj for j ∈ Θ; iιjκ
.
=
Sιjκ
(1− τβ)wljκ for j /∈ Θ. (17)
I denote household ι’s income by Aι. Total income throughout all house-
holds ι ∈ {1, ..., N} is then equal to income earned in the production of
consumption goods, Py, plus income earned in R&D, wl, minus government
expenditures R (= lump-sum taxes). Since Py = 1 by (2), this yields
N∑
ι=1
Aι = Py + wl −R = 1 + wl −R. (18)
5 Households
The utility for risk-averting household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} from an infinite stream
of consumption beginning at time T is given by
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσι e
−ρ(ν−T )dν with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (19)
where ν is time, E the expectation operator, Cι the index of consumption, ρ
the rate of time preference and 1/(1−σ) is the constant relative risk aversion.
Because investment in shares in R&D firms is the only form of saving in
the model, the budget constraint of household ι is given by
Aι = PCι +
∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj, (20)
where Aι is the household’s total income, Cι its consumption, P the consump-
tion price, and Sιj0 (Sιjκ) the household’s investment in firm 0 in industry
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j ∈ Θ (firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ). When household ι has financed a success-
ful R&D firm, it acquires the right to the firm’s profit in proportion to its
relative investment share. Thus, I define:
sιjκ household ι’s true profit from firm κ in industry j when the uncertainty
in R&D is taken into account;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in firm κ in industry j [Cf. (17)];
piαiιjκ household ι’s expected profit from firm κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ
after innovation in firm κ changes j from a two-leader into a one-leader
industry;
piβiιj0 household ι’s expected profit from firm 0 in industry j ∈ Θ after imi-
tation in firm 0 changes j from a one-leader into a two-leader industry.
The changes in the profits of firms in industry j are functions of the
increments (dqj1, dqj2, dQj) of Poisson processes (qj1, qj2, Qj) as follows:
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dsιjκ = (piαiιjκ − sιjκ)dqjκ − sιjκdqj(ζ 6=κ) when j /∈ Θ;
dsιj0 = (piβiιj0 − sιj0)dQj when j ∈ Θ. (21)
These functions can be explained as follows. Consider first industry j /∈ Θ
in which there are two innovating leaders 1 and 2. If a household invests in
firm κ, then, in the advent of a success for the firm, dqjκ = 1, the amount of
its share holdings rises up to piαiιjκ, dsιjκ = piαiιjκ − sιjκ, but in the advent
of success for the other firm ζ 6= κ in the industry, its share holdings in the
firm fall down to zero, dsιjκ = −sιjκ. Next, consider industry j ∈ Θ in which
firm 0 imitates. If a household invests in that firm, then, in the advent of a
success for the firm, dQj = 1, the amount of its share holdings rises up to
piβiιj0, dsιj0 = piβiιj0 − sιj0.
Household ι’s total income Aι consists of its wage income w (the household
supplies one labor unit), its profits sιj1 from the single leader in each industry
5This extends the idea of Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b).
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j ∈ Θ, its profits sιj1 and sιj2 from the two leaders 1 and 2 in each industry
j /∈ Θ, minus its share 1/N in the government’s expenditures R (= the
household’s lump-sum tax). Given this and proposition 2, we obtain
Aι = w +
∫
j∈Θ
sιj1dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(sιj1 + sιj2)dj − R
N
. (22)
Household ι maximizes its utility (19) by its investment, {Sιj0} for j ∈ Θ
and {Sιj1, Sιj2} for j /∈ Θ, subject to its budget constraint (20), the stochas-
tic changes (21) in its profits, the composition of its income, (22), and the
determination of its relative investment shares, (17), given the arrival rates
{Λjκ,Γj}, the wage w, the consumption price P , the subsidies (τα, τβ) and
the government’s expenditures R. In the households’ stationary equilibrium
in which the allocation of resources is invariable across technologies, this
maximization yields the following results (see Appendix A):
ljκ = `β for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`β
l
= ψ(φ, τα, τβ)
.
= ξ
[
(1− τβ)piβγ
(1− τα)piαµσ − λ
]−1
= ξ
[
(1− τβ)(1− 1/φ)γ
2(1− τα)(1− 1/µ)µσ − λ
]−1
,
∂ψ
∂φ
< 0,
∂ψ
∂τα
< 0,
∂ψ
∂τβ
> 0, ψ(φ, τ, τ) = ψ(φ, 1, 1), (23)
`α = [1− 2(1− α)ψ]l/α, (24)
g
.
= (log µ)(1− α)(Λj1 + Λj2) = (2 log µ)(1− α)(λψ + ξ)l, (25)
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g =
hz
1− τα
.
= ∇(l, α, φ, τα, τβ), ∂∇
∂l
< 0,
∂∇
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
> 0,
∂∇
∂α
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
> 0, lim
φ→µ
∂∇
∂α
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
= 0,
∂∇
∂τα
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
> 0,
∂∇
∂τβ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
> 0,
∂∇
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=τ
> 0, (26)
where z
.
= piβΓj/(wlj0) is the rate of return to investment in imitative R&D,
6
h is the households’ propensity to consume and ∇ the rate of return paid to
6Because a successful imitator obtains the profit piβ , the expected revenue from imita-
tion is the profit times the arrival rate of imitations, piβΓj . Dividing this by total imitation
cost wlj0 yields the rate of return to investment in imitative R&D.
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savings. Result (23) says that with a smaller subsidy τα to imitative R&D,
a bigger subsidy τβ to innovative R&D or with more intense PMC (i.e. a
smaller φ), R&D firms spend relatively more in innovative than imitative
R&D (i.e. a higher `β/`α). With a uniform R&D subsidy τα = τβ = τ , the
relative investment in imitation is independent of the subsidy. Result (25)
says that the larger the proportion 1−α of innovating industries or the more
each innovating firm invests (i.e. the bigger `β), the higher growth rate g.
6 General equilibrium
To close the system, I now specify how the proportion α of imitating indus-
tries is determined. When innovation occurs in an industry, this industry
switches from the group of two-leader industries to that of one-leader indus-
tries, and when imitation occurs in an industry, this industry switches from
one-leader industries to two-leader industries. In a steady-state equilibrium,
every time a new superior-quality product is discovered in some industry,
imitation must occur in some other industry.7 Thus, the rate at which in-
dustries leave the group of two-leader industries, β(Λj1 +Λj2)dν, is equal to
the rate at which industries leave the group of one-leader industries, αΓjdν.
This, (7), (23) and (24) yield
2(1− α)(λψ + ξ)l = 2(1− α)(λ`β + ξl) = 2β(λ`β + ξl) = αγ`α
= γ[l − 2(1− α)`β] = γ[l − 2(1− α)ψ]l,
from which I solve for the proportion of one-leader industries as follows:
α = Ψ(ψ)
.
= 1− γ/2
(λ+ γ)ψ + ξ
, Ψ′ =
dΨ
dψ
> 0. (27)
Inserting (27) into (25), the following equation can be defined:
l(ψ, g) = 2
[
1
γ
+
1
λ+ ξ/ψ
]
g,
∂l
∂ψ
> 0,
∂l
∂g
=
l
g
> 0. (28)
7Cf. Segerstrom (1991), p. 817.
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The four equations (23), (26), (27) and (28) form a system of four un-
known variables: employment in R&D, l, the proportion of innovative labor
in R&D, ψ, the proportion of one-leader industries, α, and the growth rate
g. The comparative statics of this system yields the result [Appendix B]
g(φ, τα, τβ),
∂g
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τα=τ
> 0, lim
φ→µ
∂g
∂τα
∣∣∣∣
τα=τα=0
> 0, lim
φ→µ
∂g
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
> 0.
(29)
This can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 4 A small uniform subsidy τ to all R&D boost economic growth.
If the mark-up factor in the two-leader industries is initially high enough (i.e.
φ → µ), then less intense price competition (i.e. a higher mark-up φ) or a
small targeted subsidy τα to imitative R&D is growth enhancing.
A subsidy to imitative R&D and a higher producer’s market power in the
two-leader industries are equivalent in the sense that they both increase the
expected profit of a successful imitation. This has two opposing effects on
the extent of innovation. First, it increases the overall investment in R&D,
a proportion of which is used in innovation. Second, it increases the propor-
tion of investment being used in imitation and decreases that being used in
innovation. If the mark-up in the two leader industries, φ, is already close to
that in the one-leader industries, µ, the latter effect is weak and outweighed
by the former. In such a case, investment in innovative R&D and the growth
rate will increase. Otherwise, the outcome remains ambiguous. If a uniform
subsidy to all R&D is used, then the second reallocating effect disappears
altogether and the growth rate increases.
7 Optimal public policy
The symmetry across the households ι = 1, ..., n yields Cι = y/N . Noting
Cι = y/N , (8), (14), (27) and (53), a single household’s consumption relative
14
to the level of productivity, c, can be written as follows:
c(g, α, φ)
.
=
Cι
B{tk}
=
y/N
B{tk}
=
x
N
χ =
[
1− l(ψ, g)
N
]
χ
= χ(α, φ)
[
1− 1
N
l
(
Ψ−1(α), g
)]
,
∂c
∂g
= − χ
N
∂l
∂g
= − cl
xg
< 0, (30)
where Ψ−1 is the inverse function of Ψ. Given this, a single household’s
utility function (19) takes the form
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
c(g, α, φ)σ
(
B{tk}
)σ
e−ρ(ν−T )dν. (31)
On the assumption that the government is benevolent, it maximizes the
representative household’s welfare (31). I consider two cases:
(a) First-best policy. The government can discriminate between innovation
and imitation, τα 6= τβ. Because there is one-to-one correspondence
from (τα, τβ) to (g, α) through (23), (27) and (29), the government can
control the growth rate g and the proportion of imitating industries,
α, by the subsidies (τα, τβ). It maximizes social welfare (31) by the
growth rate g and the proportion of imitating industries, α.
(b) Second-best policy. The government cannot discriminate between inno-
vation and imitation, τα = τβ = τ . Given (27) and (29), the proportion
of imitating industries, α, is wholly exogenous and the growth rate
g can be controlled by the uniform subsidy τ . The government then
maximizes social welfare (31) by g.
I denote:
Υ({tk}) the value of each industry k using current technology tk.
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
the value of industry j using technology tj +1, when other
industries k 6= j use current technology tk.
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The maximization problems in both the first-best (a) and second-best (b)
cases above lead to the Bellman equation
ρΥ(t) =
{
maxg,αF in the first-best policy (a),
maxg F in the second-best policy (b),
where
F .= c(g, α, φ)σ(B{tk})σ + ∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj
=
c(g, α, φ)σ(
B{tk}
)−σ + g(1− α) log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj. (32)
(a) First-best policy. The socially optimal levels for the growth rate g and
the proportion of imitating industries, α, are given by [see Appendix C]
g∗ =
ρσ log µ
(µσ − 1)(σ + x/l) , α
∗ =
η
η + l/x
, (33)
where
η(g, α, φ)
.
= −α
c
∂c
∂α
(34)
is the elasticity of consumption with respect to imitation.
Inserting g = g∗ from (33) into (26) yields
Proposition 5 The welfare-maximizing subsidy to imitative R&D is
τ ∗α = 1−
hz
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g∗
= 1−
(
σ
l
x
+ 1
)hz
ρ
.
The starting point is that τ ∗α determines the welfare-maximizing levels for
both subsidies τα and τβ. In the next proposition, I examine how much τα
and τβ should be differentiated. The lower the propensity to consume, h,
the average rate of return to investment in imitative R&D, z, or the relative
proportion of workers in R&D, l/x, the more R&D should be subsidized.
The promotion of R&D by subsidies speeds up growth and increases future
consumption and welfare. On the other hand, it crowds out the produc-
tion of consumption goods through higher wages and decreases welfare. The
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subsidies to R&D should be increased as long as the former growth effect
dominates over the latter current-consumption effect. The lower the propen-
sity to consume, h, the weaker the current-consumption effect and the higher
the optimal subsidy. The lower the “private” rate of return z to imitative
R&D, the higher subsidy is needed to cover the gap between it and the social
rate of return to imitative R&D. Finally, the lower the relative proportion
of workers in R&D, l/x, the less a proportional increase in R&D crowds out
current consumption and the higher the optimal subsidy.
Inserting (25) and (33) into (23), we obtain [see Appendix D]:
Proposition 6 If the government can discriminate between innovation and
imitation, τα 6= τβ, then the welfare-maximizing subsidy to innovative R&D,
τ ∗β , is determined by
1− τ ∗β
1− τα =
[
λ
γ
+
(
λ
γ
+ 1
)
ξ
γ
2
(
1 + 1
η
l
x
)− ξ
]
µσ
piα
piβ
,
∂
∂(η x
l
)
(1− τ ∗β
1− τα
)
> 0.
The bigger the relative profit in the two-leader industries, piβ/piα, or the less
workers there are in R&D (i.e. the smaller l), the more the government should
prefer innovation to imitation (i.e. the higher τ ∗β relative to τα and the lower
the ratio (1− τ ∗β)/(1− τα)). The profit in the two-leader industries, piβ, and
the subsidy to imitative R&D, τα, are strategic substitutes, for they both
increase the incentives to imitate. Therefore, at the optimum, the increase
in piβ relative to piα should lead to the decrease in τα relative to τβ.
Given proposition 3, PMC causes inefficiency. Noting (30), (32) and
proposition 3, we obtain:
Proposition 7 In the first-best case τα 6= τβ, the increase of PMC (i.e. a
smaller φ) is welfare diminishing, ∂F/∂φ > 0.
(b) Second-best policy. The optimal level α∗ of α is given by (33). Because
α is an decreasing function of φ through ψ [cf. (23) and (27)], there is a
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socially optimal level φ∗ for the mark-up factor φ as well. This result can be
rephrased as follows:
Proposition 8 If the government cannot discriminate between innovation
and imitation but uses the uniform subsidy τ optimally, then there is an
“inverted-U” relationship between PMC and welfare. When PMC is weak
enough for φ < φ∗ (strong enough for φ > φ∗), it should be strengthened
(weakened) to raise (lower) φ.
PMC has two opposing effects. It decreases the consumption price and
thereby increases current consumption. On the other hand, it transfers la-
bor from R&D to the production of goods and thereby hampers economic
growth. These opposing effects are balanced for φ = φ∗ and α = α∗.
8 Conclusions
This paper examines a multi-industry economy in which growth is generated
by creative destruction: a firm creating the newest technology by a success-
ful R&D project crowds out the other firms with older technologies from the
market so that the latter lose their value. A research firms can innovate to
produce better versions of the products or imitate to copy existing innova-
tions. Firms finance their R&D by issuing shares, and households save only
in these shares. The government subsidizes R&D, possibly discriminating be-
tween innovation and imitation, and promotes collusion or product market
competition (PMC). The main findings of this paper are as follows.
Each industry has either (i) one leader and a number of imitating follow-
ers, or (ii) two leaders which both innovate and no followers which would
imitate. In the first-best, one labor unit in the consumption-good sector
produces the largest amount of consumption. PMC produces a distortion
through allocating too much labor in the two-leader and too little labor in
the one-leader industries. In terms of consumption, lower output in the one-
leader industries outweighs higher output in the two-leader industries.
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The lower the propensity to consume, the average rate of return to invest-
ment in imitative R&D or the relative proportion of workers in R&D, the
more R&D should be subsidized. The promotion of R&D by subsidies speeds
up growth and increases future consumption and welfare. On the other hand,
it crowds out the production of consumption goods through higher wages and
decreases welfare. The subsidies to R&D should be increased as long as the
former growth effect dominates over the latter current-consumption effect.
The lower the propensity to consume, the weaker the current-consumption
effect and the higher the optimal subsidy. The lower the “private” rate of
return to imitative R&D, the higher subsidy is needed to cover the gap be-
tween it and the social rate of return to imitative R&D. Finally, the lower
the relative proportion of workers in R&D, the less a proportional increase
in R&D crowds out current consumption and the higher the optimal subsidy.
The bigger relative profit in the two-leader industries, the more the gov-
ernment should subsidize innovation relative to imitation. The profit in the
two-leader industries and the subsidy to imitative R&D are strategic sub-
stitutes, for they both increase the incentives to imitate. Therefore, at the
optimum, the increase in the former should lead to the decrease in the latter.
In the second-best case in which the government cannot discriminate
between innovation and imitation, there is an “inverted-U” relationship be-
tween PMC and social welfare. PMC has two opposing effects. PMC has two
opposing effects. It decreases the consumption price and thereby increases
current consumption. On the other hand, it transfers labor from R&D to
the production of goods and thereby hampers economic growth. PMC is at
the optimum when these opposing effects are balanced. When PMC is below
(above) its optimum level, it should be increased (increased).
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly styl-
ized dynamic model is used to explain the relationship of growth, product
market competition and public policy, the following judgement nevertheless
seems to be justified. With the exclusion of the second-best case, there
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seems to be no support to the assertion that imitation-induced PMC would
be growth enhancing. In the literature, a common explanation of such re-
sult is that competition reduces the rewards from innovation and thereby
incentives to engage innovative activity,8 but this paper provides a different
story. PMC reduces incentives to imitative, not to innovative R&D. In such a
case, households transfer their investment from imitating to innovating firms,
firms spend longer time in the imitative stage, the proportion of innovative
industries decreases and the growth rate falls.
Appendix
A. Results (23)-(29)
I denote:
Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk}) the value of receiving profits sιkυ from all firms υ in all in-
dustries k using current technology tk.
Ω
(
piαiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
the value of receiving the profit piαiιjκ
from firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ using technology tj +1, but receiving no
profits from the other firm which was a leader in that industry when
technology tj was used, and receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all firms υ in
other industries k 6= j with current technology tk.
Ω
(
piβiιj1, piβiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)
the value of receiving profits piβiιjκ from firms
κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j ∈ Θ, but receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all firms
υ in the other industries k 6= j with current technology tk.
The Bellman equation associated with the household’s maximization is9
ρΩ
({sιkυ}, {tk}) = max
Sιj ≥ 0 for all j
Ξι, (35)
8Cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), pp. 223-226.
9Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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where
Ξι
.
= Cσι +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj
[
Ω
(
piβiιj1, piβiιj1, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})]dj
+
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
[
Ω
(
piαiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})]dj.
(36)
Because ∂Cι/∂Sιjκ = −1/P by (20), the first-order conditions are given by
Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
[
Ω
(
piαiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (37)
Γj
d
dSιj0
[
Ω
(
piβiιj1, piβiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {tk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j ∈ Θ. (38)
I try the solution that for each household ι the propensity to consume, hι, and
the subjective interest rate rι are independent of income Aι, i.e. PCι = hιAι
and Ω = Cσι /rι.
Let us denote variables depending on technology tk by superscript tk.
Since according to (22) income A
{tk}
ι depends directly on variables {stkιk}, I
denote A
{tk}
ι ({stkιk}). Assuming that hι is invariant across technologies yields
P {tk}C{tk}ι = hιA
{tk}
ι ({stkιk}). (39)
The share in the next innovator tj+1 is determined by investment under the
present technology tj, s
tj+1
ιjκ = piαi
tj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ. The share in the next imitator
is determined by investment under the same technology tj, s
tj
ιjκ = piβi
tj
ιjκ for
j ∈ Θ. The value functions are then given by
Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk}) = Ω(piβiιj1, piβiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}) = 1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
,
Ω
(
piαiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
=
1
rι
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ
. (40)
Given this, we obtain
∂Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk})
∂S
tj
ιj
= 0. (41)
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From (17), (22), (39), (40), s
tj+1
ιjκ = piαi
tj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ, and stjιjκ = piβitjιjκ for
j ∈ Θ it follows that
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
∂i
tj
ιjκ
= piα for j /∈ Θ,
∂s
tj
ιj0
∂i
tj
ιj0
= piβ for j ∈ Θ, ∂A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
=
∂A
{tk}
ι
∂s
tj
ιjκ
= 1,
∂i
tj
ιj0
∂S
tj
ιj0
=
1
(1− τα)w{tk}l{tk}j0
for j ∈ Θ, ∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
1
(1− τβ)w{tk}l{tk}jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
∂Ω
(
piαiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
σ
rι
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1 ∂Ctj+1,{tk 6=j}ι
∂A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
hι/P
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
∂A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∂s
tj+1
ιjκ
∂i
tj
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pi
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
piασhι
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιP tj+1,{tk 6=j}
∂i
tj
ιjκ
∂S
tj
ιjκ
=
piαhισ
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τβ)rιw{tk}P tj+1,{tk 6=j}l{tk}jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
(42)
∂Ω
(
piβiιj1, piβiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)
∂S
tj
ιj0
=
σ
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1 ∂C{tk}ι
∂A
{tk}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
=hι/P {tk}
∂A
{tk}
ι
s
tj
ιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
s
tj
ιj0
∂itιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=piβ
∂itιj0
∂Stιj0
=
piβσhι
rιP {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1 ∂itιj0
∂Stιj0
=
piβhισ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τα)rιw{tk}P {tk}l{tk}j0
for j ∈ Θ. (43)
I focus on a stationary equilibrium where the growth rate g and the
allocation of labor, (ljκ, x), are invariant across technologies. Given (2), (8),
(11) and (14), this implies
l
{tk}
jκ = ljκ, x
{tk} = x = N − l, w{tk} = w = x/ϕ,
P {tk}
P tj+1,{tk 6=j}
=
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
C
{tk}
ι
=
A
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
A
{tk}
ι
=
ytj+1,{tk 6=j}
y{tk}
=
Btj+1,{tk 6=j}
B{tk}
= µ.
(44)
22
Inserting (36), (39), (40), (44) and g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ ljdj into equation (35) yields
0 =
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
Γjdj
]
Ω
({sιkυ}, {tk})− (C{tk}ι )σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
ΛjκΩ
(
piαiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
dj
−
∫
j∈Θ
ΓjΩ
(
piβiιj1, piβiιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {tk}
)
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{tk}ι )σ
rι
− (C{tk}ι )σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
rι
(
C
{tj+1},{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{tk}ι )σ
rι
− (C{tk}ι )σ − ∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
µσ
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ
dj
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ[
ρ+ (1− µσ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj − rι
]
=
1
rι
(
C{tk}ι
)σ[
ρ− rι + 1− µ
σ
log µ
g
]
.
This equation is equivalent to
rι = ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g. (45)
Because there is symmetry throughout all households ι, their propensity
to consume is equal, hι = h. From hι = h, (15), (16), (18), (20), (22) and
(39) it follows that
wl −R = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj −R
= (1− τα)w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + (1− τβ)w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj
=
N∑
ι=1
[∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj
]
=
N∑
ι=1
(Aι − PCι)
= (1− h)
N∑
ι=1
Aι = (1− h)(1 + wl −R).
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Solving for the propensity to consume, we obtain
hι = h =
1
1 + wl −R. (46)
Given (8) and (14), we obtain the wage
w =
ϕ
x
=
ϕ(α, piβ)
N − l . (47)
I define the rate of return to imitative R&D by z
.
= piβΓj/(wlj0). Inserting
this, (9), (10), (41), (42), (43) and piα = 1− 1/µ and piβ = (1− 1/φ)/2 from
proposition 2 into (37) and (38), we obtain
(1− 1/µ)hλσµσ(C{tk}ι )σ−1(λ+ ξl/ljκ)
(1− τβ)
(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {tk}
=
σpiαhιµ
σΛjκ
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τβ)rιwljκP {tk}
=
σpiαhιΛjκ
(
C
tj+1,{tk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τβ)rιwljκP ttj+1,{tk 6=j}
= Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
Ω
(
piαiιj, {sι(k 6=j)}, tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
=
σ
P {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (48)
1
2
(1− 1/φ)hγσ(C{tk}ι )σ−1
(1− τα)
(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {tk}
=
σh
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
z
(1− τα)
(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
P {tk}
=
σpiβhιΓj
(
C
{tk}
ι
)σ−1
(1− τα)rιwlj0P {tk} = Γj
d
dSιj0
Ω
({piβiιj1, piβiιj2, {sιm(k 6=j)}, {tk})
=
σ
P {tk}
(
C{tk}ι
)σ−1
for j ∈ Θ. (49)
Given equations (48) and (49) and proposition 2, we obtain
ljκ = `β for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`β
l
= ψ(φ, τα, τβ)
.
= ξ
[
(1− τβ)(1− 1/φ)γ/2
(1− τα)(1− 1/µ)µσ − λ
]−1
,
∂ψ/∂φ < 0, ∂ψ/∂τα < 0, ∂ψ/∂τβ > 0, [∂ψ/∂τ ]τα=τβ=τ = 0. (50)
Equations (2), (7), (8), (9), (12), (13), (14), (15), (46), (49) and (50) yield
w =
ϕ(α, φ)
x
=
ϕ(α, φ)
N − l ,
l =
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj = `β
∫
j /∈Θ
dj + `α
∫
j∈Θ
dj
= α`α + 2(1− α)`β = α`α + 2(1− α)ψl,
`α = [1− 2(1− α)ψ]l/α,
24
R = τα
∫
j∈Θ
wlj0dj + τβ
∫
j /∈Θ
(wlj1 + wlj2)dj
= ταw`α
∫
j∈Θ
dj + 2τβw`β
∫
j /∈Θ
dj = ταw`αα + 2τβw`β(1− α)
=
{
τα[1− 2(1− α)ψ] + 2τβ(1− α)ψ
}
wl
=
[
τα + 2(1− α)ψ(τβ − τα)
]
wl,
h =
Py∑
ιAι
=
1
1 + wl −R =
1
1 +
[
1− τα + 2(1− α)ψ(τα − τβ)
]
wl
=
N − l
N − l + [1− τα + 2(1− α)ψ(τα − τβ)]ϕ(α, φ) ,
Λjκ = λl
ξ
jκl
1−ξ = λψξl for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2},
g = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = (log µ)(1− α)(Λj1 + Λj2)
= (2λ log µ)(1− α)ψξl, (51)
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g =
hz
1− τα =
(1− 1/φ)γh
2(1− τα)w =
(1− 1/φ)γh(N − l)
2(1− τα)ϕ(α, φ)
=
(1− 1/φ)γ
2(1− τα)
(N − l)/ϕ(α, φ)
1 +
[
1− τα + 2(1− α)ψ(φ, τα, τβ)(τα − τβ)
]
ϕ(α, φ)l/(N − l)
.
= ∇(l, α, φ, τα, τβ), ∂∇
∂l
< 0,
∂∇
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
> 0,
∂∇
∂α
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
> 0,
lim
φ→µ
∂∇
∂α
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ
> 0,
∂∇
∂τα
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
> 0,
∂∇
∂τβ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
> 0,
∂∇
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=τ
> 0.
(52)
Equations (50), (51) and (52) define (23)-(26).
B. Results (29)
Inserting the functions (23), (27) and (28) into (26), we obtain
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g = ∆(φ, τα, τβ, g)
.
= ∇(l(ψ(φ, τα, τβ), g), α(ψ(φ, τα, τβ)), φ, τα, τβ),
(53)
in which
∂∆
∂g
=
∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
∂l
∂g︸︷︷︸
+
< 0,
∂∆
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=τ
=
∂∇
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0,
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∂∆
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
=
∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
∂l
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂∇
∂α︸︷︷︸
+
∂α
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂∇
∂φ︸︷︷︸
+
,
lim
φ→µ
∂∆
∂φ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
=
∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
∂l
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂φ︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂∇
∂φ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0,
∂∆
∂τα
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
=
∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
∂l
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂τα︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂∇
∂α︸︷︷︸
+
∂α
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂τα︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂∇
∂τα︸︷︷︸
+
,
lim
φ→µ
∂∆
∂τα
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
=
∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
∂l
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂τα︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂∇
∂τα︸︷︷︸
+
> 0,
∂∆
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=τ
=
∂∇
∂τ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0,
∂∆
∂τβ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=0
=
∂∇
∂l︸︷︷︸
−
∂l
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂τβ︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂∇
∂α︸︷︷︸
+
∂α
∂ψ︸︷︷︸
+
∂ψ
∂τβ︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂∇
∂τβ︸︷︷︸
+
.
The growth rate g and employment in R&D, l are determined by the two
equations (28) and (53). In the (g, l)-plane, the equation (28) defines the
increasing line OL that goes through the origin, and the equation (53) the
increasing curve GG [see Fig. 1]. The equilibrium for (g, l) is in the intersec-
tion Q of these. If 1−µ
σ
log µ
< ∂∆
∂g
< 0, then the curve GG were steeper than the
line OL at equilibrium Q and it is plausible that the equilibrium is unstable.
Assume for instance that a household adjusts its investment in R&D (i.e. l)
along line OL towards the curve GG on which its subjective discount factor
ρ + 1−µ
σ
log µ
g is equal to the rate of return to savings, ∇. The system then es-
capes from equilibrium Q along line OL when GG is steeper, but converges
to Q when OL is steeper. I therefore assume 0 > 1−µ
σ
log µ
> ∂∆
∂g
. The line OL is
then steeper at Q and the system converges to Q. Equation (53) defines the
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function g(α, φ, τα, τβ) with the properties limφ→µ ∂g/∂φ > 0 and
lim
φ→µ
∂g
∂φ
=
(
1− µσ
log µ
− ∂∆
∂g︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1
lim
φ→µ
∂∆
∂φ
> 0,
∂g
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
τα=τβ=τ
=
∂∆
∂τ︸︷︷︸
+
(
1− µσ
log µ
− ∂∆
∂g︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)−1
> 0.
C. Results (33)
Noting (30), the first-order conditions for g and α in the government’s
maximization are given by
∂F
∂g
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ ∂c
∂g
+
1
(1− α) log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj
= 0, (54)
∂F
∂α
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ ∂c
∂α
+
g
(1− α)2 log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj
= 0. (55)
I try the solution
Υ
({tk}) .= ϑcσ(B{tk})σ, (56)
where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. Noting
(11) and (56), we then obtain
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
= ϑcσ
(
Btj+1,{tk}
)σ
= ϑµσcσ
(
B{tk}
)σ
= µσΥ
({tk}). (57)
Inserting (56) and (57) into the Bellman equation (32), we obtain
0 = cσ
(
B{tk}
)σ
+
g/(1− α)
log µ
∫
j /∈Θ
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj − ρΥ({tk})
= Υ
({tk})[1/ϑ− ρ+ (µσ − 1)g/(log µ)]
and
1/ϑ = ρ− (µσ − 1)g/(log µ) < ρ. (58)
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Given (30), (34)-(56), (57) and (58), we obtain
∂F
∂g
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ ∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
log µ
Υ
({tk}) = ( σ
ϑc
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
log µ
)
Υ
({tk})
=
(µσ − 1
σ log µ
− l
ϑxg
)
σΥ
({tk}) = [µσ − 1
σ log µ
−
(
ρ− µ
σ − 1
log µ
g
) l
xg
]
σΥ
({tk})
= 0, (59)
∂F
∂α
= σcσ−1
(
B{tk}
)σ ∂c
∂α
+
(µσ − 1)g
(1− α) log µΥ
({tk})
=
( σ
cϑ
∂c
∂α
+
µσ − 1
log µ
g
1− α
)
Υ
({tk}) = (1
c
∂c
∂α
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
ϑg
1− α
)σ
ϑ
Υ
({tk})
=
[
− η
α
+
l
(1− α)x
]σ
ϑ
Υ
({tk}) = 0. (60)
Noting (59), we obtain
g =
ρσ log µ
(µσ − 1)(σ + x/l) .
Given (34) and (60), ∂c/∂α < 0, η > 0 and α
.
= η/(η + l/x) hold.
D. Proposition 6
Inserting α = α∗ and (33) into (27) and noting yields
γ/2
(λ+ γ)ψ + ξ
= α = α∗ =
η
η + l/x
.
From this and (23) it follows that
ξ
[
(1− τβ)piβγ
(1− τα)piαµσ − λ
]−1
= ψ =
1
λ+ γ
[
γ
2
(
1 +
1
η
l
x
)
− ξ
]
.
Solving for the ratio (1− τ ∗β)/(1− τα) and noting (14), we obtain
1− τ ∗β
1− τα =
{
λ
γ
+
(λ
γ
+ 1
)
ξ
[
γ
2
(
1 +
1
η
l
x
)
− ξ
]−1}
µσ
piα
piβ
.
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